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ABSTRACT 
 
The nature of food and foodborne diseases has changed dramatically over last 
century. Hundreds of millions of people worldwide, both in developed and developing 
countries, suffers from diseases caused by contaminated food. WHO/FAO and 
governments all over the world are intensifying their efforts to improve food safety. The 
causative agents includes bacteria (Campylobacter spp., Clostridium perfringens, E. coli 
O157:H7, other E. coli, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., 
Staphylococcus aureus-enterotoxin, Brucella spp., Vibrio spp. Bacillus Anthracis), 
viruses (Hepatitis A, E, Norwalk-like viruses, Enteroviruses), prions (vCJD, BSE) and 
parasites (Cyclospora, Toxoplasma gondii, Giardia lamblia). 
 
 Food bio-terrorism is defined as an act of threat of deliberate contamination of 
food and water (used in preparation of food) for human consumption, with biological 
agents. Several pathogens could potentially be delivered by bioterrorists through foods 
(Bacillus Anthracis, Shigella spp., Salmonella spp., Clostridium perfringens, Vibrio spp. 
E. Coli, Brucella spp.). Deliberate contamination of food can occur along the food chain 
from farm to table. Many developing countries, lack basic food safety infrastructure are 
very vulnerable to deliberate acts of sabotage. Contamination of food in one country can 
have significant effects in other parts of the world. The target could be civilian population 
and military personal. Potential effects can be impact on public health services, illnesses 
and deaths, economic, trade, social and political implications.  Suspicious outbreaks, with 
unexpected or unusual clinical or epidemiological characteristics, may be the results of 
covert biological attack by another nation, criminal or terrorist attack, or escape of a 
biological agent from facility developing prohibited weapons.   
 
Advances of National health surveillance systems, regulatory control, 
infrastructure development, research, education, enhance the epidemiological and 
investigative skills of healthcare professionals, including laboratory personal, developing 
and introducing advanced and rapid  biological identification systems, introducing and 
implementing HACCP, GMP and ISO standards, are necessary measures to ensure the 
food safety and adequate response on bio-terrorist attack or threat.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Food bio-terrorism is defined as an act or threat of deliberate contamination of 
food (including water used in the preparation of food) for human consumption with 
biological agents for the purpose of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or 
disrupting social, economic or political stability. 
 
 Thousands of outbreaks of disease occur annually among humans, domestic 
animals, crop plants, and wild animals and plants. More than 200 known diseases are 
transmitted through food. The causes of foodborne illness include viruses, bacteria, 
parasites, toxins, metals, and prions. The symptoms of foodborne illness range from mild 
gastroenteritis to life-threatening neurologic, hepatic and renal syndromes. 
 
Foodborne diseases agents belongs to subset of  List of Category B, second 
highest priority agents (Salmonella spp., Shigella dysenteriae, E. coli O157:H7, Vibrio 
cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum) ( Mitchem K, 2002). Analysis of Mead at al. (1999) 
in their study suggested that unknown agents account for approximately 81% of 
foodborne illness and hospitalizations, and 64% of deaths. Among cases due to known 
agents, Norwalk-like viruses account over 67% of all cases, 33% of hospitalizations, 7% 
of deaths.  E.coli O157:H7 was estimated to cause 10,000 to 20,000 illnesses annually.  
 
Threats from terrorists, criminals and other anti-social groups who target the 
safety of the food supply are already a reality. Deliberate contamination of food can 
occur at any vulnerable point along the food chain (table 1). Potential effects of food bio-
terrorism could be:1) Illness and deaths; 2) Economic and trade effects; 3) Impact on 
public health services; 4) Social and political implications. This release would probably 
initially be considered as a natural or unintentional event. Civilian populations are usually 
more vulnerable than military personnel. Ashford at al. in 44 of 1,099 investigations, 
identified causative agents had bio-terrorism potential. In six investigations, intentional 
use of infectious agents was considered (Ashford at al., 2003).  
 
Contamination of food in one country can also have significant effect on health in 
other parts of the world. Cooperative effort between government and food industry is 
necessary. WHO is in a unique position to coordinate existing international systems for 
public health surveillance and emergency response, which could include consideration of 
food bio-terrorism. Member States require alert, preparedness and response systems that 
are capable of minimizing any risks to public health from real to threatened food 
terrorism (WHO, 2002).  
 
SUSPICIOUS  OUTBREAKS 
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Despite advances in the identification of pathogens, outbreaks of unexplained 
illnesses continue to occur. Suspicious outbreaks with unexpected or unusual clinical or 
epidemiological characteristics should consider the possibility of covert biological attack 
by another nation, criminal or terrorist attack, covert attack by a nation on a sub-national 
group within its borders, or escape of a biological agent from a facility developing 
prohibited weapons (Wheelis, 2000). Also, the etiologic agent may differ from agents 
naturally found in the environment. Multiple infections (with several strains) are not 
normally encountered in natural outbreaks. Intentional contamination may resemble 
naturally occurring outbreaks, may spread slowly through a population, and may involve 
endemic pathogens. Because of the potential similarity between naturally occurring and 
intentional outbreaks and increased threat of bio-terrorism, the intentional contamination 
should be considered in cases of: 1) unusual or not easily explained outbreaks, 2) 
outbreaks resulting from bio-engineered pathogens, not easily detected by existing 
assays.  
 
SURVEILLANCE 
 
Surveillance of foodborne illness is complicated by several factors. The first is 
underreporting. Although foodborne illnesses can be severe or even fatal, milder cases 
are often not detected through routine surveillance. Second, many pathogens transmitted 
through food are also spread through water or from person to person, thus obscuring the 
role of foodborne transmission. Finally, some proportion of foodborne illness is caused 
by pathogens or agents that have not yet been identified and thus cannot be diagnosed. 
Many of the pathogens of greatest concern (e.g. Campylobacter jejuni, Escherichia coli 
O157:H7, Listeria monocytogenes, Cyclospora cayetanensis) were not recognized as 
causes of foodborne illness just 20 years ago. 
  
National health surveillance systems may allow early detection of bio-terrorism. 
Education about bio-terrorism should enhance the epidemiologic and investigative skills 
of healthcare professionals, including laboratory personnel, especially those in primary 
care settings, who are likely to be the first contact for people and communities affected 
by acts of bio-terrorism. Clinical labs, especially microbiology labs, could actually 
unknowingly abet a bio-terrorist. Laboratories may have collections of specimens of 
organisms that could easily be accessed by employees, and could certainly be transferred 
to locations outside of the laboratory by anyone who knows proper handling procedures. 
The process used to obtain agents that could be used in food bio-terrorism is also corning 
under greater scrutiny (Mitchem, 2002). Until rather recently, culture were really easy to 
access by almost anybody through mail order purchases (biological agents discovered in 
Iraq,1993, were purchased from the American Type Culture Collections-Manassas, VA, 
USA, and the Pasteur Institute-Paris , France). 
 
PREVENTION 
 
In the context of food bio-terrorism, prevention means preventing the sabotage of 
food during production, processing, distribution and preparation. Although never 
completely effective, it is the first line of defense. The diversity of sources of foods, 
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including global market, makes prevention difficult, if not impossible. At the same time, 
many developing countries lack basic food safety infrastructures and are vulnerable to 
deliberate acts of sabotage.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Response to food bio-terrorism depends on awareness of the possibility of a 
terrorist act and recognition of the incident involving food. Advances and preparedness  
of National health surveillance systems, regulatory control, infrastructure development, 
research, education, enhance the epidemiological and investigative skills of healthcare 
professionals, including laboratory personal, coordination, communication and 
integration among local, regional, national and international resources, are necessary 
measures to ensure the food safety and adequate response on bio-terrorist attack or threat.  
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          Table 1. 
 
 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TYPICAL FOOD CHAIN: 
 
Agricultural production and harvesting 
 
 
Storage and transport of raw commodities 
 
 
 
Processing and manufacture 
 
 
Storage and transport of processed and manufactured products 
 
 
Wholesale and retail distribution 
 
 
 
Food service sector 
 
